On 21 April 1967, after a decade of tumultuous politics a group of Greek colonels seized control of the state. In the context of the times, military dictatorship were endemic; Greece, Chile, Vietnam, and a host of other countries succumbed to the rule of military law and underwent a period of authoritarianism. Forty years ago the Greek world was stunned as tanks rolled down Constitution Square in the center of Athens.

Over the coming months and years the Greek Diaspora, the Greek-American community mobilized and ultimately became politicized over the issue of the Junta. The insert includes vignettes of how the Greek-American community and its allies responded to the Junta. From letter-writing campaigns to lobbying Congress, declassified US Government reports as well as insightful articles on the Junta by individuals who took part in the events of this period to scholars offering historical explanations on advent of the Greek dictatorship.

The material outlined in this issue also incorporates letters and petitions to Congress, the White House and the State Department, by many Americans of non-Greek origin who, on more than one occasion, let their views be known that the US Government support the restoration of constitutional rule in the land where democracy was born.

Sadly it is impossible to include all the individuals and organizations that played a significant role during this difficult time in the history of the Greek-American and Greek-Canadian communities but the history of the Junta is a work in progress and all comments as well as accounts of the period are welcome.

Andre Gerolymatos
Kelly Hammond, research

With the support of the Hellenic Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace
The Historical Roots of the Junta

By Andre Geronymatos
Special to The National Herald

THE GREEK JUNTA was not a phenomenon of the 1960s but a byproduct of war, occupation and civil war. Who were these men who easily brushed aside the constitutional government of Greece and imposed a seven-year long military dictatorship. For the most part they came from the upper echelons of the Greek officer corps and were destined for higher commands in the armed forces. Yet, they chose treason rather than serve a democratic state. Certainly opportunism could not have figured that prominently in their decision. One possible explanation is ideology but not one stemmed in the traditional right-left politics that permeated Greek society. The roots of the Junta and authoritarianism predate the Greek state and reach further back beyond the Ottoman period to Byzantium. For centuries Greek society was torn between the absolutism represented by the Byzantine Empire as well as the Ottoman regime and the liberalism of ancient Athens. These cleavages were not resolved after the establishment of the modern Greek state but became further aggravated by the imposition of monarchical rule on the Greeks by the kings.

Great Powers of the 19th century.

ALTHOUGH DURING the first part of the 20th century the Greeks toppled and reinstated the foreign kings, this in itself did not mark significant or permanent divisions in Greek society. There were men and women who supported the notion of monarchy but in actual fact the number of actual committed royalists were few and confined to members of the wealthy or landowning classes. This situation is underscored by the fact that the Junta, ostensibly made up of hardcore royalists, easily did away with the monarchy when King Constantine refused to remain their puppet. The political decisions that threw up the Junta in 1967 had simmered just below the monarch-christian schism that daunted the Greek state. In effect, the lines had been drawn for a long time and support for a liberal or authoritarian system of government and society had seescalated through the decades.

The Axis occupation of Greece (1940-1944) exasperated these attitudes and added the left-right political rivalry that further segregated the Greeks. The end result was that the euphoria of liberation in October 1944 quickly turned into a bitter and cruel civil war. The Greek lasted until 1949 and left Greece in a bleak state. Most Greeks emerged out of occupation and civil war poor, politically divided and faced with a meager future. Hundreds of thousands immigrated leaving behind families and a life that they would never experience again.

HOW MANY MILLIONS of the Diaspora yearned to return home but spent most of their lives abroad. Those who remained faced not only years of deprivation but an authoritarian and paternalistic socio-political system. Yet in the late 1950s and early 1960s the Government of Konstantine Karamanlis slowly edged Greece out of the economic dol drums of the post-civil war period and began the process of constructing a liberal society. Sadly, the monarchy subverted Karamanlis' reforms as well as those of his successors. Hence by 1967, Greek society was again divided and moving towards the edge of the political precipice. When the Junta took power on 21 April 1967, it was a culmination of decades of divisions still smoldering from the civil war but also of fear.

Indeed the first steps towards April 21, 1967 took place in the spring of 1943, when Ioannis Rallis, the puppet prime minister, agreed to form a government but only if his regime would be permitted a security force. The Germans agreed to his demand and on April 7, 1943, the Rallis Government enacted legislation that decreed the mobilization of four Evzone Battalions. Two of these units were to be formed in Athens and the remainder in Thessaloniki. The Germans, however, had misgivings concerning the reliability of these forces, and they vetoed the deployment of any Greek military forces in the strategically important Thessaloniki.

At the same time, they only permitted the few authorized battalions to be armed with rifles and machine guns. In part these restrictions were the result of German apprehensions over the dubious loyalty of indigenous security forces, as well as the effect this would have had on their Italian allies. Until the late summer of 1943, Greece had fallen mostly under the Italian sphere of influence. Accordingly, the existence of a Greek military force could have spawned potential difficulties among the Axis partners. In view of these factors, Rallis had to contend with a token force, which, despite a persistent recruiting campaign, failed to attract a sufficient number of volunteers. These circum-

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peled any notion that the occupation would end in the immediate future; meanwhile, the growing strength of ELAS was bringing the resistance under the control of the left. Thus, by October 1943, the first battalion came into service in Athens, which was followed by a second later in the same month and by a third in December.

DURING THE SAME PERIOD, ELAS had acquired the services of Stefanos Sarafis (as its commander-in-chief) and those of other well-known military personalities. These men had the effect of attracting a large number of professional officers into the ranks of ELAS. It soon became apparent that the left would have at its disposal a well-led and experienced military force that could easily overshadow the combined strength of all the other resistance groups. These fears were justified by the outbreak of civil war in October 1943 that brought home the reality that EAM-ELAS could dominate post-war Greece and thus encouraged many conservative officers to join the security battalions. Concurrently, during the course of this internal conflict, certain members of organizations disbanded by ELAS (during the course of the civil war) sought refuge or revenge by enlisting in the security battalions. Since a large proportion of these men were republicans, the battalions, which were presented as an anti-monarchist organization, offered a natural alternative.

MOREOVER, THE LEADER of EDES (the largest anti-monarchist resistance organization), Napoleon Zervas, in March 1943 reconciled with the monarchy and ceased to represent the political will of hardcore republicans. Indeed, the political organization of the Athenian EDES fell apart in June 1943 and one faction led by two shady characters, Ioannes Voulpiotis and Anastasios Tavoularis (both had direct links with the Germans), played a prominent role in the development of the security battalions. General Theodoros Pangalos, a leader of the republican cause and a major figure in pre-war Greek politics engineered the appointment of Tavoularis to the Rallis government. He also nominated Col. V. Dertilis, another member of the republican faction, to head the security battalions. These men, in effect, used their influence to ensure that the battalions would be commanded by republican officers so as to employ these forces and prevent the return of the monarchy. Regardless of their association with the Rallis government, these officers were in a position to maintain links with Zervas, the British military mission (working with the resistance in the mountains), and certain underground organizations in Athens.

Meanwhile, the collapse of Italy (September 1943) forced the Germans to encourage the growth of the security battalions since the occupation authorities now required fresh forces to replace the Italian garrisons in Greece. Early in 1944, the Rallis government began an intensive campaign to recruit volunteers, this time successfully, into the battalions. One tactic, to maintain a steady flow of recruits, was to dismiss a considerable number of men from local police forces without any rations; to survive, they had little choice but to seek employment in the battalions. The transition was made more palatable when rumors were spread that the British and American governments secretly supported Rallis.

On March 19, the puppet government enacted legislation that...Continued on page 4

Message of the President of Hellenic American National Council on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Greek Junta

Mr. Em. Velivasakis

In today's world, Democratic values serve as the cornerstone of religious, political and social freedom. It is this freedom that allows man to continuously strive to attain the goals of Community, Brotherhood and Peace.

Democracy, which originated in Athens, is Hellenism's legacy to the world. It is a legacy deeply treasured by people of every race, creed and color, as society's greatest achievement.

At the dawn of the 21st century, humanity is looking to shape the new millennium. Democratic ideals need to play a pivotal role in the new realities continuously confronting us in an ever-changing world, to ensure that Democracy will continue to impact and inspire the lives of the generations to come.

Every American citizen is entitled to live in a democratic environment, where they can sow the seeds of their dreams and watch them blossom. As Greek-Americans, who pride ourselves in our glorious past, we must remain ever conscious of safeguarding the Democratic ideals our ancestors dedicated their existence to. Let us honor Greece's greatest achievement: Democracy, with the knowledge that the wisdom of the past that will lead us into the future.
The Historical Roots of the Junta

Continued from page 3

permitted all officers who were dismissed from the army since 1927 to reenlist (with their former rank), providing they joined the security battalions. For many republican officers, who had been expelled from the army before the war (because of their part in the numerous coups and counter coups of the 1920s and 1930s), this was an opportunity to regain their lost status; for others, it became an important source of income. More importantly, since the battalions were advertised as a force to combat communism, the possibility existed that they would not be treated as collaborators and even might keep their rank in a postwar Greek army.

As matters stood in the spring of 1944, the republican cause was lost. Zervas had made his peace with the king and royalist officers had begun to join EDES. The mutinies in the Greek armed forces in the Middle East had triggered the removal of many republican officers, which further diminished the prospects of those in the republican faction in post war Greece. The reasoning was that since a postwar Greek army would have to accommodate officers who had fought in North Africa as well as those who had participated in the resistance (at least members of right-wing groups), this would leave little room for officers who did not belong either to a partisan force or the royalist faction.

Ironically, royalist officers faced a similar dilemma. The failure of the "Military Hierarchy" (a group of senior royalist officers) in the spring of 1943 to take control of the resistance, or to create a large royalist organization in occupied Greece, forced many royalist officers to join ELAS, EDES, or other resistance organizations. The outbreak of civil war between the right and left resistance groups in 1944 drove some of their members to the security battalions. In this way, many royalist officers enlisted in Rallis' forces. The predominance of EAM-ELAS in 1944 thus overshadowed the royalist-republican schism and threatened the social order that was home to both factions.

Consequently, by the summer of 1944, the number of security battalions increased to ten, which now included approximately one thousand professional officers. Some of these men were also encouraged to join by the ambiguous attitude of the British. For example, according to one directive issued on June 2, it was stipulated (on the BBC) that all those who joined the security battalions were assisting the Germans, but they should not be denounced as traitors. However, twenty days later, a second directive ordered all direct attacks against the battalions suspended. The ban was lifted in July, but it was only on 6 September that the Greek government-in-exile publicly denounced these units as had been agreed upon earlier at the Lebanon Conference. Even this action was a belated attempt since, despite the agreement to condemn the battalions, the announcement of the Greek government only warned their members and encouraged them to come over to the side of the allies. This vague policy is the first indication that the Greek government and the British were considering the potential use of the battalions or the employment of their officers. Another factor was the composition of the battalions, which by now included a large number of officers and men who represented the conservative element of Greek society opposed to EAM-ELAS.

Originally, the battalions simply accepted anyone who was willing to serve, but by July 1944 the Rallis government passed a decree to mobilize more recruits for the battalions.

As the day of liberation approached, these considerations, and the fear that EAM-ELAS would have the power to gain control of Greece, brought about, at the end of September, another ban on broadcasts that condemned the security battalions. An important consideration for decision was that the British would only be able to employ a small force to secure Greece after the withdrawal of the German army. Consequently, every possible anti-EAM organization could act as a deterrent against a move by ELAS to seize the country. This was particularly relevant with regard to Athens and Attica since these regions represented the strategic focal points for control of Greece.

Even after EAM agreed to participate in a government of national unity via the Caserta Agreement in late summer of 1944, the situation remained uncertain until a British force landed in Greece and the George Papandreou government of National Unity was installed in Athens. As it turned out, the British landed without incident in the security battalions were, for the time being, placed under British command, but no official action was taken against them. Despite appearances to the contrary, the political situation remained volatile and the security battalions still represented a potential weapon against ELAS.

Over the course of the fall in 1944, a general consensus began to evolve amongst the British, the Greek government, and the Greek military, which eventually led to the rehabilitation of those serving in the security battalions. Initially, these men represented expedient allies against ELAS but later they would actual be treated as allies in the war against the left. The transition, however, had begun prior to the German withdrawal. Some members of the battalions had found refuge and respectability by joining rightwing resistance organizations. Others were transferred to the Athens city police and the gendarmerie, where they remained, thus escaping internment after liberation. The rest were confined to military camps in Athens, some Aegean islands, and the Middle East. The officers, about one thousand in number, had to face a review by a military board, which would decide their eligibility for service according to individual circumstances.

On November 23, 1944, the ministry of defense published a list of approximately 250 officers who were to command units of the new national guard; of these, eight had served with the security battalions. In the ensuing uproar from the press and EAM, the government revised the list and replaced the undersecretary of defense with General Sariyannis, an officer of ELAS. Despite this outcome, the attempt to include former members of security battalions in the national guard indicated the first official attempt toward the rehabilitation of at least the officers of the battalions.

Considering the critical negotiations going on at the time between EAM and the government, the attempt was certainly provocative. A possible explanation, however, is that the Papandreou government was faced with a shortage of politically reliable officers for the national guard and the army. At the beginning of the occupation, there were approximately 4,391 officers who had survived the campaigns of 1940 and 1941. During the course of the occupation, about 600 served with ELAS, including 2,000 reserve officers, while an additional 2,500 joined the Greek forces in the Middle East. The rest either served with EDES and the other smaller resistance groups, remained inactive or left the country to avoid a possible internment. A possible explanation, however, is that the Papandreou government was faced with a shortage of politically reliable officers for the national guard and the army. At the beginning of the occupation, there were approximately 4,391 officers who had survived the campaigns of 1940 and 1941. During the course of the occupation, about 600 served with ELAS, including 2,000 reserve officers, while an additional 2,500 joined the Greek forces in the Middle East. The rest either served with EDES and the other smaller resistance groups, remained inactive or left the country to avoid a possible internment.
tive, or served with the security battalions.

**AFTER THE PURGE** of he armed forces in the Middle East, the government was left with the Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Squadron, which combined could only provide a minimal number of officers for the new armed forces. One possibility was to employ officers who had served with ELAS, but they were not considered politically reliable; the other alternative was to make use of the one thousand officers who had served with the security battalions. Indeed, the latter would provide the most dependable reserve since it was to their advantage to keep ELAS officers outside the armed forces and support a right-wing government.

In the middle of November 1944, the British began to release officers who were associated with the battalions from Averof Prison, and during the same period some of these men were seen in uniform in the streets of Athens. Other members of the battalions were assisted by the British and officers from the Greek general staff to leave Greece and find refuge in Egypt. According to one OSS report, former members of the battalions who were released in early November were afterwards slowly integrated into formed into regular army units. At the beginning of December, all the officers of the security battalions held at the Goudi army camp were permitted to draw a salary comparable to the one received by officers in the Greek army. The December uprising in 1944, however, created the final impetus for the release and employment of the majority of those in the battalions.

According to General Leonidas Spais, who was then undersecretary of defense, the decision to use the security battalions was taken on December 12. The suggestion came from the British, but Spais made the final determination and appointed 228 officers who had served with the battalions and, along with 221 officers from ELAS, despite the apparent impartiality of this selection, succeeding governments between 1945-1946 tended to discriminate in favor of officers from the security battalions rather than appointing officers with a record of service in ELAS. In fact, the Greek general staff placed ELAS officers eligible for service on the inactive list, permitting them to draw their salary until they were officially retired shortly afterwards.

**LATER IN THE SAME YEAR**, the courts, trying collaborators, reduced the formation of the security battalions did not fall under the category of collaboration because their function had been to maintain law and order and to act against “criminal elements.” This rule and the work of the military committees, in effect, provided the judicial framework for the government to employ members of the battalions and to continue to use those already in state service. In September 1945, however, the national guard was withdrawn from active service and its function was taken over by the reorganized gendarmerie. Consequently, with the exception of the 224 officers appointed to the national army, the majority of those who had transferred from the security battalions to the national guard now found themselves removed from active service.

This setback was only temporary; the outbreak of civil war in 1946 and the conditions within the national army created a new opportunity for officers of the battalions to gain admission into the armed forces. The civil war forced the government to commit the Greek army while it was in the process of reorganization. Concurrently, the new army had come under the influence of conservative officers who favored the monarchy since they regarded it as the best safeguard against communism. To enforce their brand of nationalism, some of these officers, in the autumn of 1944, formed a secret organization that came to be known by its acronym of IDEA (Sacred League of Greek Officers). Initially, the efforts of IDEA were confined to infiltrating the new divisions raised by the government and there is no evidence to suggest that any contacts developed with officers from the security battalions now in the national guard.

**IN THE SUMMER OF 1946**, representatives of IDEA took the initiative and persuaded the minister of defense to incorporate into the army officers who had served in the security battalions. The reason for this, according to the unofficial biographer of IDEA, George Karaganis, was that officers of the battalions were not only capable professionals but also the most fanatical anticommunists. Another relevant factor was that officers who had served with the security battalions and later with the national guard had the most experience in counterinsurgency operations. This expertise was particularly relevant since the officers in the new national army had been trained for conventional warfare and were ill-prepared to lead units against the more experienced formations of the communist Democratic Army.

WE CAN ASSUME THAT, since IDEA was instrumental in rehabilitating officers of the security battalions, they in turn provided additional support for that organization within the officer corps. This became evident after the end of the civil war, when a large number of these officers remained in the Greek army and some survived to participate in the 1967 coup. The prime example is George Papadopoulos, the leading figure in the 1967 coup and Junta, who had also served in the notorious units. Many others like him, had honeycombed into the Greek armed forces and security services, after 1967 and served as the internal praetorian guard of the Junta.

Parts of this article, as well as the references, were published as “The Security Battalions and the Civil War in The Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring 1985.
By Prof. D. G. Koussoulas
Special to The National Herald

April 21, 1967: forty years ago, the democratic system in Greece was overthrown by a military coup that imposed on the country a seven-year-long dictatorship. It is a dark anniversary. Nonetheless, writing about deplorable events may serve occasionally a useful purpose. After all, History often can provide lessons that may help us avoid similar calamities in the future.

The unraveling of political stability in Greece had started two years earlier, in the summer of 1965. The electoral victory of the Center Union in February 1964 had brought to forefront of the political stage a new political personality, Andreas Papandreou. He was the son of Prime Minister George Papandreou, the leader of the C.U., the veteran liberal statesman. Andreas was a prominent economist, a long-time professor in the United States. He had returned to Greece in 1961 at the invitation of Constantine Karamanlis, the conservative Prime Minister at the time, as a favor to George Papandreou.

Andreas Papandreou was a very intelligent, very forceful, and very ambitious individual. Inevitably, once he entered politics, he was bound to give rise to rivalries even within his own party. With his father being very advanced in years, several leading members of the C.U.—Constantine Mitsotakis the most important among them—were trying to position themselves for the succession. They saw Andreas as an obstacle.

On the other side, many in the conservative camp suspected that Andreas had Socialist leanings—which in the political climate of the time were in the eyes of many tantamount to pro-Communist views. Andreas was going to take over the Ministry of Defense. It was a summary of what was in the letter. In his response, Constantine repeated briefly that he opposed this because of the suspicions regarding the connections of Andreas with the ASPIDA.

There was no anger in this exchange. Constantine was very fond of old Papandreou. The liberal leader had become Prime Minister almost at the same time Constantine had become King after the death of his father. In the early months of 1964, Constantine had found in the old statesman a respected friend and advisor—just as his late father had been to him before. Papandreou on his part was fully prepared to work closely with the young King.

The first dark clouds had appeared on the political horizon in the spring of 1965 as mentioned above.

THE DISSENSION DEEPENS

If the political strife were limited to the replacement of Garoufalias, the dispute might have ended there. But after the removal of Garoufalias, George Papandreou as Prime Minister declared that he was going to take over the Ministry of Defense, himself. The opposition now clamored that Papandreou was trying to block any further investigation of the ASPIDA to protect Andreas.

King Constantine—a young and inexperienced man at the time—and “marionettes.” Andreas and his rivals within the C.U. had switched sides and gave a vote of confidence together with ERE
Greece 1967: The Undoing of a Democracy

Deputies. This, of course, did not solve the problem. It simply postponed the only proper solution: the holding of elections.

A COMPROMISE OUT OF THE IMPASSE?

As I mentioned above, in August 1966, during my visit to Greece I had a discussion with King Constantine. During the meeting, I suggested that the only way out of the impasse was for him to agree to hold elections and for the Center Union to stop the virulently attacks against the Throne. “But this is exactly what I want,” he responded with such spontaneity that I felt that this was something he really wanted.

I did not expect to be directly involved in Greek politics but the King’s response appeared as a ray of hope to move the country out of the debilitating controversy.

“Tomorrow,” I said, “I have an appointment to see Andreas Papandreou, and two days later I will meet with George Papandreou. Do you want me to tell them about what you just said?” He authorized me to do so and report their reaction to him.

I met Andreas at his office on Soudias Street. After he listened to what I had to say, he replied: “I cannot be involved. What will my people say?” He added, however, that the widow of one of the sons of Eleutherios Venizelos had ties with the Palace and she could act as a go-between.

George Papandreou showed much more positive interest in the compromise solution I had discussed with Constantine. Then, in the course of our conversation—after we had met at his home in Kastri—I told Papandreou that when I discussed with Constantine the rumors that some people were afraid that he was planning to impose a dictatorial regime, the King replied that his late father had warned him that “another dictatorship will be the end of the Throne.” I said to George Papandreou that I was left with the strong impression that Constantine was sincere.

At the end of my visit, I told Papandreou that upon my return to the United States I was planning to write an article about my reading of the situation in Greece. He suggested that I sent him a copy ahead of time, “not to censor it,” as he said with humor but to have it for possible publication in Greece.

When I called the palace to report to King Constantine my impressions from my talks with Andreas and George Papandreou, it was ambassador D. Bitsios, the King’s “political advisor,” who came to the phone. He said that the King was not available and that he was going to pass on to his “political advisor” the information I had. I did not like this. In my response I was very guarded, giving the bare essentials. To my utter astonishment, on Tuesday, August 30, three days after my telephone conversation with Bitsios, the newspaper “Akropolis” came out with an eight-column headline: “Papandreou aims at the dethronement (removal) of the King.” In the article, there was a sensational “revelation” that the former Minister of Defense Peter Garoufalias had disclosed to the newspaper that George Papandreou had discussed at a meeting of the Inner Ministerial Council plans for removing Constantine and replacing him with Prince Peter. According to the article, Garoufalias claimed that this discussion had taken place when Papandreou was still Prime Minister, before his resignation from the premiership.

The publication of this totally unfounded story was designed to scare Constantine away from any further contact with Papandreou. (Bitsios later became Foreign Minister during the Junta). I called George Papandreou and told him about my talk with Bitsios. The old statesman advised me to go ahead with the article I was planning to write after my return to Washington and to do exactly what we had discussed.

I followed his suggestions. The article was published on Sunday, October 16, 1966 in the “Evening Star,” one of two major newspapers in Washington, at the time. To my surprise, the article, translated into Greek, was published on the front page of the newspaper “To Vima” in Athens four days later. Without fax in those days, to have a long article translated in its entirety and published within such a short period of time was remarkable. This was made possible only because G. Papandreou had already taken the necessary steps.

In the article, I had described the political situation in Greece and suggested that unless a way was found out of the impasse, “certain elements in the Army, acting on their own and without the support of the King, may move to establish an unconstitutional dictatorial regime.” I went on to say that to prevent such a calamity, the King ought to agree to hold elections and the Center Union should stop the attacks against the Palace.

The publication of the article so prominently by a newspaper with strong ties to the Center Union and George Papandreou caused a sensation. Two days later, Andreas Papandreou, speaking in Crete denounced my remark about the danger of a dictatorial regime by calling it a “threat” and a “blackmail,” while he rejected any thought of a compromise solution as the one suggested in the article.

Attacks came also from the conservative press. The articles published were clearly designed to turn Constantine against any compromise with George Papandreou.

But the effort had not been in vain. Some three weeks later, contacts between Constantine and George Papandreou were resumed through Vassilis Houtas, a national resistance leader during the German occupation, and C.U. Deputy. On December 18, a formal agreement was signed. It was a detailed road map leading to “free and honest” elections.

It was a way out of the impasse. But at the request of George Papandreou, it was agreed to keep the agreement secret. He was afraid of the negative reaction of the more fanatical elements in his party, above all of his son Andreas. It was a misguided decision because at a time when the support of an informed public was paramount, it left an open field for the extremists of both sides.

In implementing the agreement, a first step was for the Stefanopoulos government to resign. It did so on December 21, and was replaced by a “service cabinet” under I Paraskevopoulos, a banker. The King in a proclamation pledged to hold elections in May. Papandreou, on his part, issued a formal statement in which he welcomed the King’s initiative to hold elections and his pledge that the elections will be “honest.”

There was no reference to the Continued on page 8
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Continued from page 7

Agreement. What followed might have been avoided if Constantine and Papandreou had told the people the full story and asked for their support.

ATTACKS FROM BOTH SIDES

Within four days, Andreas unleashed the first salvo. It was an uncompromising rejection of the arrangements his father had accepted. Although compromise solutions are a cardinal part of the democratic political process, in Greece during that critical period, “compromise” was considered by Andreas as well as the extremists on the conservative side an ignominious capitulation.

The Paraskevopoulos “service cabinet” received a vote of confidence from both major political parties, the Center Union and ERE. However, forty C.U. Deputies followed the lead of Andreas and voted against the “service government.”

In the following months attacks from both sides of the extremists but most notably from the partisans following Andreas Papandreou undermined the government which was supposed to prepare the ground for elections.

The sessions in the Greek legislature were turning into verbal fist-fights. Con. Karamanlis, a self exile in Paris since 1963, wrote to Babis Markotos, the then publisher of the “Ethnikos Kyrix,” who had urged him in a letter to return to Greece and salvage the situation.

“Forget the conditions needed for a serious and constructive effort do not exist now in Greece.” In another communication, Karamanlis had suggested to Panayiotis Kanelopoulos who had assumed the leadership of ERE, that the legislature grant a government for a short period of time “specific powers” for the revision of the Constitution which is obsolete and maladjusted; improvement of the economy, which is a condition for the material and moral progress of the country; a fair solution of the Cypriot issue; and a non-partisan effort to improve the educational system.”

In the conditions prevailing in Greece at the time there was not a chance for a calm political climate. Emotions were high, both sides underestimating the Paraskevopoulos “service government,” to promote their own agendas.

THE DEMISE OF DEMOCRACY

The agreement of the previous December was losing all relevance. Even moderate leaders on the conservative side were now questioning the wisdom of having elections. Andreas was not only emerging as the dominant leader in the C.U., he was also forging ties with EDA, the pro-Communist party.

In the political climate of the Cold War this was seen by many as a calamity. Throughout the post-war years, both the conservative and the liberal parties in Greece had refused to join forces with EDA even when this appeared politically expedient. In the election of November 1963, when the C.U. had received a thin plurality but not a majority, George Papandreou had called for a new election refusing to stay in power with the votes of the EDA deputies in the Vouli. In the eyes of his detractors, Andreas was transforming radically the political equation. His statement that he would form a government at Constitution Square, implying that he would ignore the constitutional processes, threw more oil into the fire.

On March 28, the Greek legislature met to discuss the proportional electoral system and a proposal to lift the parliamentary immunity from a number of deputies, including Andreas Papandreou. For the sake of salvaging whatever was left from the agreement to go to elections this proposal was voted down by both liberal and conservative Deputies. It was a constructive move. However, the following day Deputies aligned with Andreas proposed that the parliamentary immunity be extended for four weeks even after the end of the legislative period. Such an extension was unconstitutional. Its objective was to protect primarily Andreas from possible prosecution over ASPIDA, during the period between elections and the swearing in of the new legislature.

An acrimonious debate in the Vouli showed that virtually nothing remained from the Agreement Constantine and George Papandreou had forged four months earlier. The extremists had won. It was going to prove a hollow victory.

Faced with a total impasse, Prime Minister Paraskevopoulos came to the rostrum and made a brief statement: “The discussion shows clearly [how total is] the disagreement of the two political parties on whose support this government depends. Therefore we face a governmental crisis.” Meaning, his government had to resign.

Following this, the President of the Vouli made the customary statement almost indifferently: “The session is adjourned until the governmental crisis is resolved.” It turned out to be an overoptimistic statement. The Vouli would not meet again for seven and a half years—until the collapse of the dictatorship.

ENTER THE TANKS

It was not going to be a royal dictatorship as Andreas had predicted. Neither was it going to be a dictatorship led by the senior officers. They were unwilling to move without the approval of the King, and Constantine was adamant against a dictatorial regime. But the dictatorship came nonetheless.

During the wee hours of April 21, 1967, a group of middle level officers launched their coup, using the tanks that had been brought to Athens four weeks before for the parade of the 25 of March, Independence Day.

The fanaticism of the extreme factions had wrought the undoing of the Greek democratic system, thereby opening the gates to the conspirators. Aspiring dictators may always be found hiding in the shadows but they cannot move unless those who believe in democracy forget that moderation is at the heart of a democratic system.

Professor Kousoulas came to the United States in 1951 as a Fulbright Scholar. A professor of Political Science for twenty five years, he is the author of several books published by Oxford University Press, Syracuse University Press, Ballantine, Scribner’s, Wadsworth and Rutledge. One of his books was translated and published in twenty seven languages. During the 1960s, he became involved in Greek politics. In 1964, during the Cypriot crisis, he was elected president of the Pan-American Committee Justice for Cyprus. His most recent book is “The Life and Times of Constantine the Great: The First Christian Emperor.” Currently, he writes a bi-weekly column for "The National Herald."
Mutations of History

By Nikolaos A. Stavrou
Special to The National Herald

Funny things were happening few months before the Cyprus tragedy and the collapse of the Junta. For over a year prior to its collapse I had reached some disturbing conclusions that proved to be tragically accurate. First, that the Junta would abolish the monarchy to gain temporary reprieve from the left, second that it would open to the Eastern bloc as a leverage against Washington where pressure against would be mounting, and third that it could be foolish enough to attempt to please Henry Kissinger with a “solution of the Cyprus issue”, a certain disaster if carried out.

Months before the brave naval defections, the Velos affair, I alerted General Orestis Vocalis, the King’s man in America, of the impending abolition of the monarchy. The general advised me to write directly to the King in Rome, something I was reluctant to do. But under the emerging dire circumstance, I wrote a two-paragraph letter on May 1, 1973 in straight Epirotic dialect telling the King “your days are numbered” and it might be useful for history if he spoke up pre-emptively against the Junta. I never heard from His Majesty. Two months later, using the Velos defection as a pretext, the Junta abolished the monarchy.

Between 1973 and its collapse, the leading members of the Junta made several openings to the Eastern bloc countries culminating with a Nickolaos Makarezos trip to China. At the same time, a huge influx of Soviet bloc money poured into Greece investing in critical areas of the economy including shipping. The famous deal for hydrofoils (now in Greece as flying dolphins) which made a millionaire out of an ordinary Cretan crook was sealed at that time; and, Lord and behold, with Soviet finances the entire Great Soviet Encyclopedia was translated into Greek. No other western country had even thought about undertaking such a thing, but a bunch of “anti-communist” hoodlums who decided to bring the Greeks up to date with the achievements of Bolshevism.

At the beginning of 1974 matters turned tragic. One senior Junta man had set up shop in a Medical Clinic of his brother-in-law, whose owner would brag about his “direct connections with Kissinger and assured the Greek idiot that Henry, the de facto American President, would be pleased with a putsch against Makarios. Nothing to worry about! Another member of the Junta was visiting his Koumbaro (in-law) in Atlanta as an excuse to stop by Washington and get “clarification” to one question: how would the American react, “if we carry out another quick coup with General Angelis in charge and bring back Karamanlis?” To beef up his credibility, this Junta man would flash a bunch of personal letters from Constantine Karamanlis to argue that the latter was not adverse to the idea. And there were others who surfaced in Washington at the time prompting the same idea, among them a shady character who had occupied the legal authorities in New Jersey and Florida.

I had established contact with Karamanlis for many years and was disturbed by the fact that more than one shady character was cozying up to him. Though a severe critic of Karamanlis’ policies, I had come to respect his intellect. In 1969, the former Greek premier had graciously and meticulously taught other lawyers how to take cases to trial and win. If you think that you need legal advice, do not hesitate to call - we can help

Looking at a gloomy horizon, I urged him in the Spring of 1974, (as I have done a year earlier) to further clarify his position concerning the “Karamanlis solution” that was eagerly promoted by self-serving individuals with questionable motives and to denounce the Junta one more time publicly, perhaps to avoid a national disaster. My concern was that the “many Koumbaro” (in-laws) who were visiting Washington promoting the “Karamanlis solution” were also capable of mortgaging his name to the instigators of the Junta. His response of 10 March 1974 is a telling document for historians.

Though I was resigned at the time to the inevitability of a coup in Cyprus. I believe my last letter to Karamanlis (of which I can not locate a copy but remember the contents fairly well) and his response shed some light on his thinking at the time. The reader should be the judge of its significance, but I would like to note a human side of Karamanlis. He sought my assistance in getting his nephew Costas, now Prime Minister, admitted to Harvard. I responded that I could get him easily admitted to Johns Hopkins and mailed to him in Paris all pertinent applications and programs of the University. The “roushfeti” was overtaken by the July events and the young Karamanlis ended up at Tufts.

(* Makarezos was a senior member of the Junta and served as minister of coordination from 1967-1971 and deputy prime minister 1971-1974. In 1975 he was condemned to death for high treason but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.)
Greek Americans Against the Junta
Then and Now

As soon as news of the April 21 coup came over the radio, I received concerned calls from friends. What could they do to help Greece? Seeking an answer to their queries that afternoon I joined hundreds of protestors who went to the Greek Consulate to protest the establishment of a military dictatorship in Greece. The American Committee for Freedom and Democracy in Greece (ACDFG) would emerge from that first rally and become the largest and most active of the anti-junta committees in the United States.
ANTI-JUNTA ACTIVISTS would fall into four loosely defined groups. The most intense were Greek graduate students studying in America who spoke out bravely even though they understood this meant they could not return to Greece as long as the junta remained in power. Nearly as vocal were academics from various fields that could not accept the idea of a military dictatorship in Greece. Addi Pollis, who became a key leader of ACDFG, is representative of this group. Two smaller categories were leftists who had supported EAM-ELAS in World War II and younger persons, such as myself, who were active in the anti-Vietnam War and civil rights movements of the time.

A political disagreement soon emerged that set the tone of the movement. What would be our position regarding political prisoners? Some academics and veteran community activists feared a demand to free all political prisoners would foil support among Greeks and Americans as some of the junta’s prisoners were leftists. I was among those who thought this was outdated thinking and utter nonsense. No one had been arrested in Greece for illegal acts or planning an insurrection. They had been imprisoned as part of an effort to thwart a democratic election that would have brought George Papandreou to power. Our slogan couldn’t possibly be Free Some of the Political Prisoners or Free the Political Prisoners We Support. Reason prevailed in this matter, setting an important precedent for tolerance of political differences that prevailed throughout the struggle.

I thought Greek Americans would be outraged by what had happened in the place they so frequently lauded as “the cradle of democracy.” What I discovered, however, was that many Greek Americans knew almost nothing about the politics of contemporary Greece. Many imagined the junta was part of an anti-Soviet crusade and in any case, that Greece was so backward that it needed an occasional law-and-order dictatorship. Others did not want to jeopardize their present or future business and professional opportunities in Greece. Still others were fearful that being identified as anti-junta would bring harm to family members in Greece.

I WAS MOST SHOCKED by the silence of the Greek American establishment, including the Archdiocese. Individuals, of course, worked behind the scenes, but for a myriad of reasons, most organizations would not speak out until the colonels murdered university students at the Polytechnic in 1973. Better late than never to be sure, but had our organizations taken an anti-dictatorial stand early on, the time of the colonels would have been much briefer. All of us in the anti-junta movement understood that if the US strongly objected to the colonels, the regime would fall instantly. Our plan was to rouse Greeks Americans to the task of educating the American public and the American government on the wisdom of opposing a Greek military dictatorship. Eventually dozens of committees formed across North America for this purpose. The largest were in Greek centers such as New York, Chicago, Boston, Toronto, and Montreal, but there were also groups in cities such as Detroit, Minneapolis, Milwaukee, San Francisco, and Indianapolis. Countless newsletters, letter campaigns, visits to Congress, and rallies took place. New York and other cities had radio programs. A huge boost to the anti-junta movement was the presence in New York of Melina Mercouri, who was performing in a stage version of Never On Sunday on Broadway. Melina possessed strong political views and an even stronger will. By immediately speaking out against the junta, she gave the movement credibility with the American public and gave us access to American mass media. For a time, her apartment on One Fifth Avenue was the informal center of anti-junta activities.

I HAD ONLY MOVED to New York in 1966. I had no circle of family or school friends as in my native Detroit. The movement now brought me into contact with a whole new constellation of Greeks and Greek Americans, many of whom have remained life-long friends. As a youth, I had been greatly taken by films such as Stella, He Who Must Die, and Never on Sunday. I never imagined I would be working with the same Melina Mercouri on a political level, but such was the case. For a year or so I worked often with Spyro Mercuri, Melina’s brother, to create political events that would feature his charismatic sister. I attained more visibility in the anti-junta movement than my experience and knowledge warranted. This was mainly due to the fact that I had no close family in Greece and I had no professional or business relationships there. I also had gained experience in public speaking from my involvement in the anti-Vietnam War movement. This often resulted in my serving as a spokesperson at one or another anti-junta event. I even went across country in 1968 trying to connect small local committees that had sprung up with national groups and to start committees where there seemed to be interest. I met an amazing number of Greek Americans of various political views who shared a common outrage at what had happened. About half were Greek-born and half American-born.

MY ACTIONS WERE NOT particularly more effective than what others did, but they indicate the nature of our efforts. An event I recall with particular pride, however, was a hunger strike three of us undertook outside the UN. King Constantine was then visiting the US, and we vowed not to eat as long as he was on US soil, a period of about three days. That modest effort on our part generated considerable radio and television coverage in American mass media. Two others joined us on the second day. One of them was extraordinarily courageous as he could not return to Greece due to his family ties and was virtually stranded in NY as an illegal alien. Had he been arrested, he would have been in a perilous situation. We hoped that dozens might come to join us once they heard what we were doing and turn the event into a real community protest. Numerous people came by to encourage us, but we remained a fistful of five. The movement was self-financed. A dance or musical event occasionally produced some revenue, but most events were just paid for by those participating. The longer the struggle went on, however, the more often individuals who wished to remained unseen for whatever reason would make cash contributions. Among public relations fund raisers that I was involved with the production of political editions of Theodorakis’s Romiosinni and Mauthausen music albums through Folkways Records. These ventures had the additional benefit of being a profound musical expression of a Hellenism with which the American public could identify. Dino Siotis followed a similar strategy in California by publishing The Coffeehouse and The Wire, anti-junta literary magazines that reached out to the American literary community. My effort in that realm was to edit a small volume of poetry to which many prominent American poets contributed. It was titled Z. Among the Greek Americans who contributed poems were Thamos Maskalaris and Minas Savvas.

Just as I worked in the milieu I knew best, other activists worked within their respective professional and social circles. Over the course of seven years, we discovered every means possible to mobilize the public. Although we failed in our larger goal of mobilizing a mass movement against the junta, we did not allow the ongoing Greek tragedy to slip from public view. One huge problem for us early on was the most visible Greek American politician, Vice-President Spiro Agnew, then at the height of his power. Agnew embraced rather than rejected the junta, thoroughly confusing the American and Greek American publics about the regime. Greek Americans often didn’t believe us when we said the junta routinely used electric shock torture and had banned writing such as Aristophanes for being anti-Hellenic. Greek American politicians such as John Brademas and Paul Sarbanes, of course, were resolutely anti-junta. In due course, the fall of Agnew and the emerging reality about the regime turned the

Continued on page 22
for the Vietnam War. In the context of the NATO alliance, it is of prime importance that we—
Buckley: Yes, absolutely.

Papandreou: And now I shall.

Buckley: Yes, and dwell on the instrument of oppression. If the Greek people have made an accommodation with the American government, yes, it was built on the basis of an understanding of our two countries, but it is not the basis of a friendship. It is the basis of a relationship that is based on mutual interest and mutual respect. And when I say this, I am not saying that the United States government is not important. It is. But it is not the only important thing. It is not the only thing that matters. It is not the only thing that makes a difference. It is not the only thing that we can count on. It is not the only thing that we can expect. It is not the only thing that we can hope for. It is not the only thing that we can rely on.

Papandreou: Why not? It is. And I think of course we should dwell. But I won’t repeat it too often...

Buckley: Sure.

Papandreou: Power is valuable, because time is valuable. But not only in Greece, in Portugal, in Spain, in Turkey, in Iran—and I am talking about my part of the world, I am leaving Brazil out of the way—now, under those circumstances, when most of the Middle East is practically neo-fascist, when Italy may soon be—General Vernon Walters is moving up to the second position in the CIA. Well, General Walters in 1961, November, in Italy, in a staff meeting of the U.S. embassy, said that if the socialists were to come close to power in Italy, the American troops in Italy and from German should occupy Italy.

Buckley: Well, the socialists did come to power.

Papandreou: As a matter of fact, I think it was very worthwhile for Congress to ask Mr. Walters today whether indeed he has repeated the statement now. It’d be very important for Congress to find out what General Walters thinks about Italy today, and whether indeed in Italy a new patch is not under way.

Buckley: Managed by the CIA?

Papandreou: Managed? Well, you know I get a bit lost, because for instance there is a man in Greece who played a very important role, Mr. Norbert Anschutz (?). He was the charge d’affaires. Actually I knew him very well. And if he thought of him as a charge d’affaires. Now it turns out that he was a colonel in the U.S. Army, that’s Pentagon. It turns out he is officially a top CIA agent. And now he turns out to be the manager of the First National Bank in Beiruti. So you ask me if it is the Pentagon, is it the First National Bank, is it the CIA, I just don’t know.

Buckley: You—do you question the wisdom of our maintaining of a CIA?

Papandreou: Not at all, sir. I do not. But I don’t want it to manage my affairs.

Buckley: Yes. Well, no...

Papandreou: I want it to manage my affairs. If you choose it.

Buckley: Yes, yes.

Papandreou: But not mine.

Buckley: Well now, are you not—or are you suggesting that Colonel Papadopoulos is an instrument of the CIA?

Papandreou: Oh, but you see I happen to know this because it was my very bad luck that I became Minister of State and I was in charge of Greek intelligence. And I was discovered to my own very great surprise. Things were happening in the Greek KYP. And we can say in Greece now is that this is the first known CIA agent to become a Prime Minister of a European country...

Buckley: Well, I think it—it seems to be going a little but far to say that someone who’s in charge of intelligence in a country which, God knows, needed an intelligence after the kind of civil war you went through, ended up simply being an agent of—the CIA...

Papandreou: Well, he happened to be...

Buckley: But I haven’t seen Papadopoulos urging a western dominated Nazi regime in Greece.

Papandreou: Yes. What is his regime? What is his regime? In fact if you do read all the editorials of the Greek press, they point out the accusing finger at the Norwegians and the Danes and the Swedes. And they say Americans, look, they are not your friends because they are playing around in a coffee shop called democracy. What you need is law and order and responsibility and honest, loyal membership in NATO for the defense of the free world—with concentration camps and torture chambers and prisons, things like that....

Papandreou: What, then, is the moral of this story?

Buckley: The moral of [this] story is that you want us to reorient western policy in NATO on both of you feeling about Greece. And I’m trying to say to you that I can share, I hope quite sincerely, your disappointment about the antidemocratic nature of that regime without, however, feeling that they ought to impose on...

Papandreou: Oh heavens....
Buckley: ...an alliance that has kept as much freedom as manages to survive in western Europe.

Papandreou: Heavens forbid no. That last thing I want is for you and the alliance to impose anything on Greece.

Buckley: Uh huh.

Papandreou: The most I want, the thing we all wish now in Greece, is that we be left alone to run our own home. We have lots of business in Greece.

Buckley: Yes, but you....

Papandreou: We have—allow me to finish, you see, unless you....

Buckley: Sure. No, go ahead, go ahead, go ahead.

Papandreou: Okay. We have much social reform to carry out in Greece. We want to bring democracy to every village. We want to build a Greece that really belongs to the Greeks and to the Greek youth. And I want to be left out of the Cold War strategic games that are ruining not only us but the world and you....

Buckley: But you can't be.

Papandreou: ...as well.

Buckley: You can't be left out. You'd be gobbled up....

Papandreou: Well, look. What do you think we are now?

Buckley: Well....

Papandreou: We are gobbled up by the Pentagon right now....

Buckley: All right. Next....

Papandreou: Go Ahead.

Papandreou: ... who make the coup in Greece? Five men. I can reel off their names.... Of the five, the four members of the Greek intelligence agency. Therefore of the five, the four members necessarily and inevitably of the CIA. The coup was a CIA coup. And it was a Pentagon supported one....

Buckley: Mr. Papandreou, I wish—I wish that the CIA were one half as powerful as you depict it as being. We would have much less difficulty throughout the world. I do know that Papasoulos was investigated as far back as 1958 it was suspected that he was involved in a coup. I also know that there are coups in Greece before the CIA was invented.

Papandreou: Yes.

Buckley: It's the obvious thing in Greece. It's the ordinary thing....

Papandreou: The ordinary?

Buckley: ...not the extraordinary thing.

Papandreou: Well, they got you there. But they miscalculated. You see, there are also more....

Buckley: It's a sort of a Birchite notion in which CIA is the villain rather than....

Papandreou: Bo. It is not. I don't believe really that the CIA is the villain. CIA is the instrument.

Buckley: Yes.

Papandreou: You have to look much deeper for the villain.

Buckley: Well, maybe the villain is the 20th Century superstition that democracy is a natural thing. People talk about Greece being the cradle of democracy. There's been very little democracy in Greece. Isn't that true?

Papandreou: Let me ask you a question.

Buckley: Plato's—Plato's democracy was based on slave.

Papandreou: Are you prepared to lose your freedoms here, Mister....

Buckley: No. I'm prepared to....

Papandreou: Are you prepared to lose them?

Buckley: I'm prepared to indulge a military-industrial complex in order to....

Papandreou: Yes....

Buckley: ...maintain those freedoms.

Papandreou: Yes. And are you prepared, however, are you prepared yourself to see any reduction of your freedoms in this country? Suppose that there is some group that calls for it. What would your stand be? I'd really be interested....

Buckley: I'd ask them what they were talking about.

Papandreou: Uh huh.

Buckley: I was inducted into the army in 1950—which was certainly a loss of my freedom. On the other hand, I understood this as a necessary corporate effort at the time.

Papandreou: Well, I volunteered in your navy because I wanted to fight the Nazis.

Buckley: Yes.

Papandreou: The only thing I might claim is that I believe in freedom and human dignity.

Buckley: Well, do you believe that the United States....

Papandreou: And I'm working for it.

Buckley: Do you believe that the United States—let me ask you a generic question now....

Papandreou: Yes.

Buckley: ...should refuse to transact at all with any country that suppresses parliamentary democracy?

Papandreou: No, sir.

Buckley: Uh huh.

Papandreou: If you ask me now put yourself, you mean, in an American....

Buckley: Sure.

Papandreou: ...statesman's shoes....

Buckley: Sure.

Papandreou: Okay. For that role I would define what I would do. I would surely not do what you have suggested. If in the interests of the nation, this collectivity that you call the United States of America, it is essential that we maintain—good relations with China, the Soviet Union, that is fine. On the other hand, if you yourself are the key member, the senior member, of an alliance, the first rule that should be observed is that you respect the member nations that have joined your alliance to defend their own freedoms and their own integrity, national integrity. And what I charge and change vigorously is that within this alliance either you have imposed on some of them very oppressive militarist regimes. And I have mentioned five in my part of the world. There are many more. But I'm talking about NATO. And Iran will soon, I think, be in NATO. To add something else, I would consider that it is very poor politics to attempt to export the American way of life in Vietnam at the cost of defoliation and really what amounts to genocide. I consider that these policies are inconsistent with human survival. And I would not espouse them. But I would not limit the freedom of an American to make deals in a peaceful context for the maintenance of world stability. Of course not.

Buckley: Uh huh. Now, did you imply by that that Lyndon Johnson controlled the movements of the colonels?

Papandreou: Yes, yes.

Buckley: ...or that it was just his prestige?

Papandreou: Oh, no. He controlled them.

Buckley: Did he call them "Greek bastards”; people he controlled?

Papandreou: Well, I expect that knowing the quality of the people they are probably he would in private. (audience laughter)

Buckley: I see. I see.

Papandreou: But he can use them.

Buckley: Yes.

Papandreou: You know, you can use a gang to do your job but you don't have to respect them for it.

Buckley: So there's a sense in which you owe your life to the fact that it was CIA agents who did the coup?

Papandreou: By the way, it could be true. And as a matter of fact, trying to be as proper as I can, after I got out of jail I went to see Philip Starboard and to ask Philip Starboard to convey to President Johnson, with whom I disagree profoundly, on the Greek issue and many other, to convey to him your personal thanks....

Buckley: Right.

Papandreou: ...for the fact that he really did save my life. Actually the people I owe it to the American economics profession and other—you know, the American Economic Association, united and without one abstention, went to the President—I mean communication to the President. Paul Samuelson, Galbraith, Walter Heller, and so forth. And so morally they are the ones I am thanking. But in fact were it not for Johnson's intervention I wouldn't be here today on your show....
October 16, 1967

Dear Sir:

The International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union is unalterable opposed to the assumption of power by a military junta in Greece. Furthermore, the International Executive Board condemns any support for that dictatorship and is appalled at the Presidential reception for King Constantine.

Through all available diplomatic channels, particularly the United Nations, we believe the United States Government should urge the following program be enacted in Greece:

1. The Full and unqualified restoration of all civil liberties and trade union rights.
2. The unconditional release of all political prisoners including the representative of the government of Greece at the time of the coup;
3. A return to the constitution existing before the coup;
4. Free elections in accordance with that constitution.

On behalf of the Executive Board

Sincerely Yours;
Louis Goldblatt
Secretary Treasurer

Mr. E Papageorgiou
Department of Economics
Iowa State University

Ames Iowa

May 17, 1967

The President of the United States
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

The Iowa State University Ad Hoc Student-Faculty Committee for the Restoration of Greek Democracy, whose arose out of the spontaneous reaction to news of events in Greece, drew up the following petition. All who signed are faculty members at Iowa State University.
United States Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations
Washington, DC
20510

March 18, 1978

The Honorable
William P. Rogers
Secretary of State
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I believe that you will understand why I am disturbed by
the enclosed article from the New York Times of March 14.

On many recent occasions I have expressed my concern
over the violation of civil liberties in Greece. I have repeat-
edly asked officials of the State Department for a statement
of our policy toward Greece and our Embassy's attitude to-
wards these abuses. Thus far I have yet to receive a satisfac-
tory answer. Only last week, in the confirmation hearing of
Mr. Stuart Rockwell, the Committee was informed that the
Administration has not yet completed its review of our poli-
cy toward Greece. The review has now been underway at
least a year.

The action of the Greek junta as described in the en-
closed article appears to be entirely indefensible. This is
particularly true if, as reported, Miss Pipinopoulou has not
been charged with any crime. I consider her arrest a serious
matter, and I ask that the American Embassy in Athens in-
vestigate this arrest on an urgent basis and take such action
as may be appropriate to secure Miss Pipinopoulou's re-
lease.

At your earliest convenience I would appreciate a full re-
port on the matter including all relevant information con-
cerning the junta's attitude toward, and possible harass-
ment of, the International Exchange program in Greece.

Sincerely yours,

J.W. Fulbright
Chairman

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Continued from page 15

Unclassified Translation

Athens, December 29, 1968

Mr. Ambassador:

In a recent meeting of the Central Committee of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement, which has no connection to the anti-dictatorial movement of the Communists in Greece, it was unanimously accepted that the strangulation of the liberties of the Greek people and the establishment of the Junta in Greece is the work exclusively of the American services and of the American Embassy here.

It was therefore unanimously decided that every American who until now was considered a friend and ally, should be regarded as an enemy of the Greek people, and as of February 1, 1968 (sic) instructions will be given to the organs of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement to act against the Americans here, civilian and military, as they acted during the occupation against the German conquerors.

It has been decided to make this known to you, and through you to the American Government, in the hope that during the intervening period of time and perhaps at the last moment, you may do away with the situation created in Greece by you, by holding free elections and not with the pseudo-constitutions with which it appears that you and your protégés the Junta are trying to deceive international public opinion.

In case of the contrary, you will be responsible if you do not hasten to inform your Government; you again will be responsible also for the victims you will lament.

The patience of the Greek people is exhausted. You are to blame, we have nothing against the Colonels, with a nod from you they go. Waste no time, do not create a new Vietnam in Greece. You had a people as a close friend; you will lose it.

As of February 1, 1969 the movement will turn against you exclusively, and all of you will be sentences to death, and he who shall kill an American will be considered a hero of liberty.

Liberty will return to Greece

With the assurance of our esteem
Panhellenic Liberation Front

Chicago Democracy For Greece Organization
4762 N. Lincoln Ave.
Chicago, Illinois 60625

Chairman Peter Scuris
April 19, 1969

The Honorable William Rogers
Secretary of State
Department of State
The United States of America
Washington, DC 20520

We of Democracy For Greece organization, speaking on behalf of the overwhelming majority of Americans of Hellenic descent, wish to express our concern over the effect that the undemocratic military regime in Greece is having upon the NATO alliance and America’s image, prestige and standing as leader of the Free World.

We would also like to bring to your attention, Sir, the present plight of one of America’s oldest allies- the people of Greece- because what happens to the people of Greece will ultimately effect the interests of our country-the United States- and we sincerely believe that the United States can exercise its tremendous influence and popularity on behalf of the people of Greece in their silences yearning to emulate America and its free and democratic institutions.

April 21 marks a black anniversary for the Greek people and the Free World, for it was on this date in 1967 when the clock of liberty, justice, democracy and progress was stopped in Greece by a handful of ignorant and fascist minded colonels using American made tanks and guns furnished them in defense of freedom and democracy.

It is a date which will long live in infamy in the annals of Greece’s long and glorious history, and will be an object lesson to future generations of Greeks as well as other peoples of the world to safeguard their civil liberties and democratic institutions from erosion, encroachment and subversion by the same forces unto which the security of the nation is entrusted.

After two years of authoritarian rule the political maturities, social justice and economic development of the Greek people and nation have been set back, perhaps as much as a generation, and the only people that have benefited have been the junta officers who now occupy the seats of government, and their relatives and cronies who could not get elected even to the post of dog catcher in a free election.

The only people that support the junta in Greece today are those who have acquired a vested interest in the regime through junta promotions and better posts, the secret police and its vast army of paid spies and informers, and some foreign enterprises that may rake in huge profits at the expense of the Greek people. During these past two years NATO has become increasingly weaker in South-East Europe as the junta colonels have purged the Greek armed forces of their most able, dedicated and experienced officers, and reduced the Greek army to an internal police force to watch closely for any organized anti-junta move among the people to stamp it out quickly and ruthlessly.

Despite these astringent police state measures all is not quiet and peaceful in Greece for thousands of Greeks have dared and are braving arrest, fine and imprisonment to express their opposition openly. More than 25,000 such arrests were made during 1968 alone.

Greece’s Nobel prize winning poet, George Seferis accused the military junta recently of enforcing a state of terror in which all intellectual values are being submerged in a swamp, and of imposing a government which is utterly contrary to the ideals for which the Greek people so magnificently fought in WWII.

In a remote mountain village in southern Greece, the most famous Greek composer, Mikis Theodorakis, (Zorba the Greek), is held in heavily guarded exile by the junta. He is ill with tuberculosis and heart trouble. His vibrant personality and prolific musical talent is not almost broken by two years of hiding, imprisonment and exile.

We ask your assistance for the immediate realist of this man of the arts from confinement and for proper medical care to be administered to him because this outstanding Greek composer does not belong to Greece but to all the world.

Composer Theodorakis is the Boris Pasternak of Greece, because he, like Pasternak, refused to submit to the humiliating and degrading dictates of the totalitarian regime of his country, and like Pasternak has been banished into exile to die a slow death.

The military dictatorship has adversely affected the life of every Greek, from the highest political leaders, to the intellectuals and scientists, to the common laborer. The King has been forced into exile; former Prime Minister Papandreou died of long confinement, house arrest and bad treatment; other former prime ministers, ministers and public servants barely survive under house arrest or under constant harassment.

Not only has America a vital interest in helping to bring about the downfall of the dictatorial military regime of the Free World, to aid the down-trodden and suffering people of Greece restore responsible parliamentary government and democratic institutions.

America can do no less if we are to expect the people of
Greece to preserve and maintain the high esteem, respect, admiration and loyalty towards America which have always characterized the Greek soul in peace and war. We are enclosing copies of published communications in our Free American press for your perusal, written by Americans condemning the anti-democratic military regime in Greece.

Respectfully yours,
Leon Fardelos
Executive Secretary

Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America
Washable Clothing, Sportswear and Novelty Workers
Local 169

Thomas Flavell, Mgr.
33 West 14th Street
New York, NY
10011

12 October, 1967.

Mr. Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
White House
Washington, DC

Hon. Sir:

At a recent meeting of the Executive Board of Local 169 of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, it was unanimously endorsed by the members of the Board that we call upon the government of the United State to refuse all economic and military aid to the illegal military government of Greece until the government of Greece restores all civil rights and liberties to the people of Greece and revives its actions in dis-banding trade union; and the restoration of political democracy to the people of Greece.

We believe that the failure of our government to act for the restoration of democratic government can be of potential damage to all democratic institutions throughout Europe and the world.

Sincerely yours,
Executive Board of Local 169,
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America

Thomas Flavell
Manager

Chicago Daily News
Monday, April 14, 1969

Views of the news
Another reason juntas can fail

A wide variety of diversity in a nation is not the primary cause fatal to military regimes as Joseph Kraft notes.

As in the case of Greece where no perplexing or insoluble problems existed, a military regime was established by a handful of ambitious colonels, defying civilian rule and fearful a freely elected government would curtail and subordinate the armed forces role for the good of all people.

The people of Greece with their long and historic free traditions and democratic institutions may appear at present to have become docile and resigned to the military regime, but in reality their deafening silence and forbearing patience are steadily giving rope to the military junta to hang itself.

It is not diversity in interests that is fatal to military regimes, but rather the union of the oppressed people drawn together by the persecution of a military regime that ultimately spells the doom of dictatorship.

The American people mist aid the people of Greece to make their dream of a free and democratic Greece come true, because it is in the best interests of the United States and the free world to do so.

Ernest J. Vardalas
Chicago

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC
October 3, 1967

Mr. George D. Woods, President
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

Mr. Anthony M. Solomon
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs
Department of State

Mr. Harold F. Linder, President
Export-Import Bank of Washington

Mr. William B. Dale
Board of Executive Directors
International Monetary Fund

Gentlemen:

We understand that there is a delegation in Washington representing the present military dictatorship of Greece seeking economic aid.

In spite of assurance by those who have seized power that there would be an early return to constitutional government in Greece, there is no evidence to support such statements. In fact, the news of what is going on in Greece gets more ominous every day.

We would consider it most unfortunate if the United States were to give any respectability to the present regime by assisting with economic aid. Such a step would do most serious damage to our position, especially in Western Europe, as a nation which believes in and supports the right of people to elect their own government.

Sincerely,
Don Edwards, M.C.
Robert W. Kastanmeier, M.C.
William R. Ryan, M.C.
Phillip Burton, M.C.

Says exiled Andreas Papandreou,
The ‘Greek Problem’ Is Really An American Problem

21 July 1968

By Andreas Papandreou

The Truman Doctrine, giving the reason for American intervention in Greece in 1947, contrasted two ways of life. One, it said, is “based upon the will of the majority…free elections…freedom from political oppression,” and the second “relies upon terror and oppression…suppression of personal freedoms.” After 20 years of overt and covert American intervention, after the expenditure of over $3.5 billion in a country about the size and population of Illinois, the result has been the triumph of the second way of life.

I point this out not to denigrate the Truman Doctrine (it is for American citizens to make appraisals and, if necessary, re-appraisals), but rather to emphasize what few Americans realize—the extent and the repercussions of United States intervention in Greek affairs. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders has defined the “Negro problem” in the United States as being basically a white problem—the product of a society infected by white racism. In the same way I believe the “Greek problem” may be defined as being basically an American problem—the product of a foreign policy distorted by a phobia about Communism.

An analogy may be drawn between Greece and Vietnam. The United States intervened in both countries, essentially for the same reason. The “domino theory” was propounded in each case. “If Greece goes” the theory said, “then Turkey and the Arab world and Italy will also go, and the entire Mediterranean will be lost.” And “if Vietnam goes, the rest of Indochina also will go, and then Thailand and Indonesia and Burma, until all of Southeast Asia is lost.”

There has been one basic difference, of course, between Greece and Vietnam. The Soviet Union remained neutral regarding Greece but has sent large-scale aid to North Vietnam. Moscow has accredited a new Greek Ambassador and has extended its commercial agreements with the junta Government. And whereas Tito closed his frontiers to the Greek revolutionaries, Mao has vied with the Russians in providing assistance of all types to North Vietnam, including laborers, foodstuffs and arms. During the Greek civil war, the United States was able, without committing any fighting units, to get what it wanted—that is, the defeat of the insurgents and the establishment of a reliably anti-Communist regime in Athens.

But the end of the civil war in 1949 did not mean the end of American involvement in Greek affairs. Washington continued to bolster and “guide” the various Athens governments, expending a total of $1.4-billion in military aid between 1950 and 1967. This enabled the representatives of the Defense Department and of the C.I.A. to play an even more important role in Greek affairs than did members of the State Department. The American military has made the substantive decisions concerning the weaponry and structural organization of the Greek Army and has exercised, through the palace, a considerable influence on promotions among Greek officers.

A number of personal experiences brought home to me the nature and extent of this outside intervention in our domestic affairs. In 1960, for instance, when I was on leave of absence from my position at the University of California and serving as economic adviser to the Bank of Athens, I was visited by the head of the C.I.A. in Greece. His purpose was to persuade me to pressure my father, a leader of the centrist parties, to accept a C.I.A.-sponsored change in the Greek electoral system.

Continued on page 18
continued from page 17

Some years later, when I had left my academic career in the States, entered Greek politics and was serving as an elected Deputy and as a member of the Cabinet, I discovered that the C.I.A. was free to operate as it wished in Greece, and that neither I nor my colleagues could effectively control it. The Greek C.I.A., the K.Y.P., was financed directly by its American counterpart rather than by the Athens Government, so it was virtually an appendage of its foreign paymaster.

The result of 20 years of such relations between Washington and Athens was the junta coup of April 21, 1967. It is perhaps not a coincidence that the head of the junta, Col. George Papadopoulos, was the liaison between the C.I.A. and the K.Y.P. and that one of the two other leaders, Nicholas Makarezos, was the Key intelligence officer of the K.Y.P. It is also noteworthy that within three weeks of the coup the newspaper columnist Marquis Childs informed his readers of the Johnson Administration’s relationship to it. The C.I.A., according to the columnist, reported the imminence of a coup, whereupon a top-secret meeting of “military, intelligence, State, all the powers dealing with the Greek problem” was held in Washington.

“The solemn question,” Childs wrote, “was whether by some subtle political intervention the coup should be prevented... The consensus around the table, after some hand-wringing and agonized appraisals of the consequences, was that no course of action was feasible... Walt Rostow, the President’s adviser on national security affairs, closed the meeting with these words: ‘I hope you understand, gentlemen, that what we have concluded here, or rather have failed to conclude, makes the future course of events in Greece inevitable.”

Whatever the origins of the coup—and history doubtless will yield further interesting revelations—the fact remains that the present dictatorship represents the failure of United States policy in Greece. Rule by Junta, after all, is the precise opposite of the democratic aspirations enunciated in the Truman Doctrine. Furthermore, it is generally agreed that the junta is intensely unpopular; the continuation of U.S. support for the dictatorship is likely to lead to another Vietnam in Greece. On the first anniversary of the coup, The New York Times reported: “What was patently a dictatorship a year ago is still patently a dictatorship and the saddest thing is that the chances of eventual bloodshed are probably increasing.”

United States assumptions and policies regarding Vietnam have been reappraised and apparently modified. A similar reappraisal is urgently needed regarding Greece before the Vietnam tragedy is repeated there. Such a reappraisal will require that certain widely accepted myths be dispelled.

Myth No. 1 is that democracy was a failure in Greece, that the Greek people are not ready for democracy. In view of recent sensational developments in the United States, this charge is at least piquant. The fact, of ours, is that the Greeks are unprepared for democracy, but rather that they have never been allowed by their foreign “protectors” to practice it. In 1841 the British Minister to Athens, Sir Edmund Lyons, stated: “A Greece truly independent is an absurdity; Greece is Russian or she is English; and since she must not be

[Photos]

[Caption reads: The Papandreous: Andreas, seen with his wife and two of their children in Paris, left, and his father George, 79, a former Premier of Greece and leader of the leftist Center Union party. Both men were arrested shortly after the coup, and the elder Papandreous spent part of his confinement in a hospital, right. When the right-wing junta declared an amnesty [illegible], Andreas went into exile.]

Russian, it is necessary that she be English...”

This great-power Realpolitik persists to the present day. One example was the agreement in October, 1944, between Churchill and Stalin dividing the Balkans into spheres of mathematically graded influence: In Rumania, there was to be 90 percent Russian influence; in Yugoslavia, 50 percent Russian and 50 percent British influence, and in Greece, 90 percent British influence. What has happened in Greece and in the other Balkan countries since World War II has much more to do with such pie-slicing than with any alleged unpreparedness for self-government. In this connection, it is relevant to note that the correspondents of the German magazine Stern have reported that the C.I.A. conducted a secret poll of Greek political attitude in March, 1967. The poll indicated that if elections were held as schedule on May 28 the Center Union and the left would receive 63 percent of the votes. Is it far-fetched to assume that the reason for the 1967 coup was a determination to forestall such a political outcome? And does it follow that the ultimate cause for the present dictatorship is not that democracy in Greece was malfunctioning but rather that it simply was not allowed to function when the people’s will appeared to threaten certain vested interests, both domestic and foreign?

The second myth about Greece is that her people are generally apathetic and accept the junta. This contention appears to be justified by the lack of any armed resistance, though this lack compromises the validity of the junta argument that the coup was designed to forestall an imminent Communist uprising. If the colonels’ contention is true, why have they been unable to discover a single cache of arms during the year they have been in power? In reality case, developments in Greece since the coup all point to popular alienation rather than cooperation. Despite frantic efforts, the junta has not been able to win the support of any outstanding politician or intellectual. This isolation has led the junta to step up its mass purges, arrests for “subversion of the social order” and barbaric torturing of prisoners, which have been described in a report of “Amnesty International” signed by Anthony Marreco of the British bar and James Becket of the American bar.

To repair its tarnished image the junta has engaged the services of the New York public relations firm of Thomas J. Deegan Company, Inc., which handles the Time Inc. and Coca-Cola accounts. For a reported fee of $243,000 a year, the Deegan concern is arguing that perhaps there have been occasional excesses in Greece but “there are no Isle Koch lampshades,” and so the country qualifies for a Coca-Cola bottling plant—“the symbol of peace and freedom.”

The Anti-Dictatorship League of Greek Officers has circulated among 3,000 officers a proclamation denouncing the junta as “a major national disaster” and calling for “the complete restoration of democratic institutions in Greece.” And on April 18 The Guardian quoted an “experienced journalist” who went to Greece to evaluate public opinion as having said: “I knew they were unpopular. But—damn it!—I couldn’t find anyone, apart from their placement, who now supports them.”

The third myth about Greece is that she has no future because of inadequate human and natural resources. Quite the contrary, one can easily establish that Greece has natural resources far richer than those of Israel and capable of supporting the population at a much higher living standard. Greece also has trained personnel to exploit her natural resources, but they are unused and being driven out of the country. The real Greek problem is not inadequate natural and human resources, but a fossilized establishment which has stifled national talent and creativity.

Turning from myths to realities, the immediate task is to get rid of the military mafia, which, despite its populist rhetoric, has merely frozen a bankrupt and discredited status quo. The end of military domination is the objective of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement, which I am honored to serve as chairman of its national council. The movement compromises the resistance organizations committed to the liberation of our country and to the restoration of the sovereignty of our people [illegible] free elections for the Constituent Assembly and the establishment of a government reflecting the will of the nation. The fundamental rights of citizens are to be guaranteed by a bill of rights, by

[Marginalia: U.S. policies regarding Vietnam have been reappraised an apparently modified. A similar reappraisal is needed regarding Greece before the Vietnam tragedy is repeated there.]

[Marginalia: “No major intellectual or politician backs the junta”]

an independent judiciary and by armed forces subject to the authority of a duly elected civilian government.

The struggle for freedom will succeed because the alternative is not viable: the junta has no answers to the problem of Greece. It offers merely an archaic religiosity and an atavistic chauvinism. In a country in which the incredibly obsolete school system is a fundamental obstacle to modernization, the Minister of Education has banned miniskirts from schools and has proscribed “indecent” films and magazines. Because of the menace of surrounding Slavs and Com-
The junta has not only failed to encourage democracy in Greece, but it has also become a fact of life and Washington will get more moderate performance out of them by displays of friendship than by maintaining correct but cool relations.

It is questionable, however, whether the Greek armed forces, purged of more than 200 experienced officers, could fill any meaningful NATO role. And it is ridiculous to argue that the United States needs the colonels more than the colonels need the United States....

The United States will be risking not only its reputation and goodwill but an element of its long-run security if it becomes involved in the unsavory business of helping to maintain the Greek dictatorship in power.

This critique exposes a basic flaw in the policies of the United States and of the 19th century's Great Powers. This flaw is the mechanistic geopolitical view of Greece as simply a strategic base in the Eastern Mediterranean. The trouble with geopolitical reasoning is that it subordinates—and often ignores—the political half of the word. It overlooks the fact that a base is not merely a geographic position, it is also a people. Without the active support of the people, the base cannot endure.

Gladstone pointed this out in criticizing the assumption of Tory policy that it was to Britain's interest to preserve the Ottoman Empire (and Ottoman rule over the Balkan Christians) as a barrier against Russian expansion to the Mediterranean. Gladstone maintained instead that "the breast of free men" constituted the most effective resistance against Russia. His contention was borne out repeatedly when independent Balkan states were created and, to Britain's surprise, proved to be fiercely nationalistic and resistant to Russian control rather than tools for Russian expansion.

Gladstone has also been proved correct by developments since World War II. Though Churchill and Stalin arranged for stipulated degrees of British and Soviet domination in the Balkans, the Balkan people have rejected such determination of their fate by foreigners, whether Russians or Westerners. Surely policy-makers with any sense of history must realize that if Gladstone's plea for "the breasts of free men" was valid in the 19th century, there can be no question as to its validity [illegible] are infinitely more alert and politically conscious. Which means, more specifically, that support for the Athens junta not only will fail to encourage democracy in Eastern Europe or anywhere else, but will fail even to protect United States interests in Greece.

On March 1, 1967, barely six weeks before the colonels seized power, I set forth my views regarding the international position of Greece as follows:

"Greece, as a developing nation, a nation barely emerging from a semicolonial status, is extremely sensitive about its national independence, its freedom to chart its own international political course, its right to pursue freely its own national interests without placing in a quandary its allied relationships. We do not raise the question concerning the participation of Greece in the NATO alliance. But at the same time we demand that Greece be recognized as an independent nation which, pursuing its own particular interests, has chosen to be a member of the Western alliance.

"Greece refuses the status of a poor relative or of a satellite. It insists on its right, while executing its obligations as an ally, to determine is own course. It affirms is right to expand is commercial, economic and cultural relations with all other nations, independently of the bloc to which they belong. It assigns special importance to developing good relations with its Balkan neighbors, the countries of the Near and Middle East and the new nations of Africa. It insists on its right to follow closely developments in the European area, where a reduction of tensions, a rapprochement among nations of the East and West and a new approach to European solidarity are taking place. But above all, Greece insists that its allies cease interfering in its internal political affairs."

I remain convinced that this statement defines properly not only the fundamental interests of the sovereign Greek nation but also the legitimate interest of all great powers.

Since the terrible assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy, this stand takes on an urgent importance. Senator Kennedy was an ardent foe of the Greek military dictatorship. He stated in March that if he were elected President he would cut off all military aid to the junta. He was against violence as a way of life. I think it is time that those of us who believe as he did, who treasure the basic rights of man, whether we be Greeks, Americans, Britons or Swedes, form an alliance to protect these rights and to fight with all means the disease of fascism and totalitarianism which is eating into the free world. When countries such as the United States or other NATO nations send arms to the military clique in Greece to be used to subjugate a people, then they are encouraging brutality and fore everywhere and sowing the seeds which will eventually destroy their own institutions. In the name of Robert Kennedy, let us try to stop this horrible sickness.

[Caption: Changing of the Guard—Troops before a Government building during the coup, Papandreou says junta leaders were close to the Greek intelligence apparatus, which the C.I.A. supported.]

Continued on page 20
Continued from page 19

Rome, October 28th, 1968

Your Excellency,

On behalf of the Greek Centre Union Party and the forcibly silent Greek people as well, I would like to appeal respectfully to the Government of the United States and to Your Excellency personally and ask your kind intervention for the prevention of another crime which the fascist government of Athens is committing now.

Many democratic citizens were arrested in Greece two months and a half ago and were subjected since their arrest to unimaginable tortures in order to "confess" participation in the Greek Resistance. There are rumors that some of them have died because of torturing. Defence attorneys and relatives were not allowed to communicate with them and no one knows where all these people have been imprisoned.

A few days ago, the military regime announced suddenly that fifteen of these people will be driven directly from the unknown inquisition center to the extraordinary military court in November 4th, 1968, without any previous judicial inquiry, without any guarantee for a fair trial. Defence attorneys are threatened and no one dares to discharge his duties and assume the defense of these people.

[Signed, Nicholas Nicolaidis]

[ Marginalia: Pol. 29 Greece to Pol. 31 Greece, Box 2155]

[ Stamp: DECLASSIFIED: Authorized illegible, By: illegible, Date: 1/ illegible] /07

The United States, leading member of the NATO Alliance, provides the military aid by which the fascist regime of Greece is not defending, of course, the liberties of the Greek people or the Western Alliance but re-enforces the chains of slavery bounding today the once free Greek people.

The Greek people can not imagine that the Government and the Democratic people of the United States, who fought side by side with the Greeks against fascism and Nazism during the world war II, will accept, without any protest, the role of an accomplice which the military junta tries de-

liberately to assign to the whole Western Alliance.

Confident that a vigorous and decisive intervention of your Excellency can definitely (sic) prevent such a crime and brutal violation of the principles of justice, I would like to submit my best personal regards and I remain,

Respectfully Yours

Dr. Nicholas Nicolaidis (signed)
Secretary General

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[The Trial of Fifteen Democratic Citizens in Greece]

Two months and a half ago massive arrests of citizens took place in Greece. The exact number and full list of the arrested citizens were never announced by the military regime. All these people were inhumanly tortured in order to "confess" participation in the Greek Resistance. There are rumors that some of them have died because of torturing. Defence Attorneys and relatives were not allowed to communicate with them and no one knows where all these people were imprisoned.

A few days ago the military regime announced suddenly that fifteen of these citizens will be driven diversly (sic) from the inquisition center to the extraordinary military court of Athens, in November 4th, 1968 incriminated for high treason according to the martial (sic) law and the "situation of siege" declared in Greece since the Coup-d’-Etat of April 21st, 1967.

The trial will take place without any previous judicial inquiry and without any guarantee for a fair judgment. Defence Attorneys are threatened and no one dares to discharge his duties and assume the defense of these people.

These people are not "terrorists", as the fascist regime tries to stage, but respectable members of the Greek community with a long and clear record of devotion to the cause of Freedom, Democracy and Justice. Their curriculum vitae are speaking by themselves.

The accused citizens are:

1. Elefterios BERIVAKIS, 32 years old, lawyer, ex-president of the youth Organizations of the Centre Union Party of Greece (G. Papandreou) member of the Central Committee of the "Young Scientists Association of Greece".
2. Alexandros PANAGOULOS, 28 years old, student of the Athens Polytechnic University and member of the Board of Directors of the Student Associations, ex-member of the Central Committee of the Centre Union Party Youth Organization.
3. Ioannis VALASELIS, 32 years old, Economist, President of the "Air Companies Employees Association", Secretary of the Syndicalist Department of the Youth Organization of the Centre Union Party of Greece, Vice-President of the "Democratic Labour Renaissance", the Labour Movement of the Centre Union Party.
4. Ioannis KONIZIKAS, 30 years old, Civil Engineer, ex-leader of the Student Movement of Greece, member of Engineers Association of Greece.
5. Artemios KONIZIKAS, 34 years old, Medical Doctor, ex-leader of the Greek Student Movement.
7. Georgios ELEFTERIDAS, 39 years old, Vice-Mayor of the City of Hellincon of the Athens Greater Area.
8. Alexandros SIGALAS, Taxi-driver, Syndicalist.
11. Rustamioh YIOTAS, 28 years old, Lawyer, Secretary of the Local Chapter of the Center Union Party Youth Organization.
12. Antonios PRINTEZIS, 29 years old, Hotel Manager, Syndicalist.
13. Nicolaos ZAMPELIS, 22 years old, Taxi-driver, member of the Centre Union Party Youth Organization.
14. Michael PAPOUTAS, years old, Auto-Mechanic, member of the Centre Union Party Youth Organization.
15. Nicolaos LEKANIDIS, 29 years old, Proprietar (sic), member of the Centre Union Party.

[ MGN: Authorized illegible, By: illegible, Date: 1/ illegible] /07

WNI 229 VIA RCA
LONDON 0335 APRIL 27 1967

THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE

MALIGNANT FORCES ARE CONSPIRING TO OBLETATE THE LIGHT OF GREECE AND TO IMPOSE A PRIMITIVE DARKNESS UNHEEDING THAT DEMOCRACY HAS NO FRONTIER THEY OFFEND FREE PEOPLES EVERYWHERE SIRE YOU ARE THE LEADER OF A LIBERTY LOVING PEOPLE I URGE YOU TO DEFEND OUR MUTUAL AND SINGLE HONOR A KIND AND UNKIND FATE WOULD HAVE IT THAT I FIND MYSELF IN ENGLAND IN THIS TIME OF MY COUNTRY’S CRISIS UNKIND

(signed) Stamatis Niercouris
Senior Deputy of Greece
In London at time of His country’s crisis
December 5, 1973

The Honorable William P. Rogers
Secretary of State of the United States
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C.

My Dear Secretary Rogers:

This will confirm the briefing I gave the Honorable Roger Davis, and George Churchill, concerning my trip to Greece earlier this month.

As you know, I did meet with the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. George Papadopoulos, as well as the Vice Premier Mr. Stylianos Patakou. Both Mr. Papadopoulos and Mr. Patakou asked to be remembered to you with the fondest regards. Specifically, the message that Mr. Papadopoulos gave me for you, was that it is his desire and that of his colleagues, to continue the friendliest of relationships with our country, to do all that is possible for our mutual interests, to devote their abilities and energies to building a better Greece under the democratic regime. Mr. Papadopoulos informed me that he and his colleagues have pledged themselves to do everything possible in providing the Greek people with the best type of government they can offer.

My recent trip, left me with the distinct impression, that the average Greek, living and working in the cities and surrounding areas, feels a great deal of security to say nothing of prosperity under the Papadopoulos government. I made it a point, to talk with a number of individuals, in order to get a totally unbiased opinion concerning the political climate as it exists, and the feeling of the man on the street concerning the present government. My conclusion, was that by and large the majority of the Greek people are in favor of the present government and express themselves in that vein. The obvious accomplishments in economics, tourism, building and improvements are visible for all to observe and take note of. From chambermaids in hotels, to taxi drivers, who I have found as a class universally seem to be able to place their finger on the pulse of an area, expressed the overall feeling that this particular government has finally given the average Greek a feeling of permanency and stability.

What impressed me tremendously with Mr. Papadopoulos and the other members of the government was that they are the first to admit that they are by no means perfect in all that they do, but they are trying with all of their capabilities and conscience to furnish Greece with good government.

Insofar as Greece’s military posture is concerned, I am convinced that the majority of the officers and men comprising the Armed Forces possess a high esprit de corps, and excellent morale. They are proud men who feel a keen obligation to fulfill the NATO obligations, and as observed by our own General Goodpaster, and Admiral Zumwalt, their contributions have been excellent.

I feel Mr. Secretary, that as an American of Greek descent, our ties, and philosophies are similar with those of Greece. Certainly, we have no better friend and ally than we do with Greece, and its people. I resent, the continuous criticisms of the present government, by certain members of the Congress, who in my opinion are making comments that you are well aware of, for the sole purpose of political expediency. Additionally, certain members of the press media, are quick to condemn the present government without being truly informed of its posture, and its activities. Certainly, we should not for the sake of some misguided individuals, jeopardize our position in southern Europe, where we have a faithful and good friend in Greece. You more than anybody knows what the international situation actually is, and you have seen classical illustrations of a total change of attitude from nations that we have supported, spent huge sums of money, only to be ultimately turned away either because of new political affiliations, or because of economic improvement, and a dislike for the hand of friendship which we extended.

This, is not the case in Greece. I feel everything should be done to strengthen our ties with this great nation, and we should lend all the support we can to present government who are attempting to create stability and balance once and for all. I strongly believe, that in the event that the present government of Greece does not fulfill or live up to its promises and expectations, the Greek people will rescind their vote of confidence as they well have the right to do.

I will be pleased to report to you at any time that I feel there is information of a constructive nature that you should be appraised of, and assuring you of my appreciation and support of all of your great achievements as our Secretary of State,

I remain

Most cordially,

John N. Parker

JNP: cm
Greek Americans Against the Junta

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Greek American public against the junta. But it was only the horrendous attempt to assassinate Archbishop Makarios in the coup that brought on the Turkish invasion that made Greek America realize the colonels were utterly despicable. From the vantage point of four decades, we can see that the colonels inadvertently brought on the very reforms they had hoped to thwart. The colonels thought they were carrying forward the authoritarian form of government that had been imposed on Greece since the nineteenth century; but unintentionally, they brought that period to an end. Their disastrous regime permanently soured the Greek public on military solutions to its political and economic problems. Since the fall of the junta, Greek political life increasingly has followed the pattern of the most advanced Western democracies.

COSTAS KARANMALIS played a major role in that transition, a role that was not anticipated by many in the anti-junta movement. When Lambrakis was murdered in Thessaloniki in 1963, Karamanlis had resigned his office and gone into self-exile in Paris. He did not participate in the pre-election violations of the constitution in the mid-1960s, and he denounced the junta from the outset. When the colonels fell in 1974, the conservative Karamanlis, trusted by the right and respected by the left, had established the credentials to lead Greece to normalcy. The ensuing six years were perhaps the finest in his career. He resolutely led Greece into the EU. Part of that effort included putting a period to the civil war by legalizing the Communist Party and allowing the civil war exiles to return. Another unintended consequence of the junta was that it catalyzed political discourse about Greece within the United States. All of us in the anti-junta movement needed to understand the traditions that had produce these colonels. What was it in contemporary Greek society that had bred a civil war in the 1940s and a dictatorship in the 1960s? Not only did we want this junta to end, we wanted to write to los to the tradition of periodic mili- tary dictatorships. One of the first to take on these issues was a group of academics in Indianapolis who began a periodical that eventually took the name Journal of the Hellenic Di- aspora.

Even more eventful than the founding of the JHD was the forma- tion of the Modern Greek Studies As- sociation by academics involved in the anti-junta movement. In its for- mative years and early symposia, the MGSA often focused on the origins of the Greek tyrants. Later, it would launch the Journal of Modern Greek Studies. Among the MGSA’s founders was Harry Psomiades, the editor of a Greek American weekly and a number of other publications.

While the regime in Greece resents this critic- icism, its opponents feel it is not strong enough. Former politicians now in opposition and a sizeable part of the Greek population feel American is the regime’s backer. This, many diplomats believe, ruins the chances of America’s leverage here and when the regime changes. It is a difficult situation in which few clearcut answers and decisions are possible. It complicates America’s role in this strate- gic Mediterranean enough.

The creation of the Journal of Modern Greek Studies programs have shown remarkable success. Artists active in the anti-junta movement also remain much in evid- ence. Dino Sirots, for one, has been publisher of important transoceanic cultural journals such as The Aegean Review and Mondo Greco. Peter Pappas went on to become an editor of a Greek American weekly and is now among the editors of the on-line magazine greekworks.com which also has published important books such as Spero Vryonis’ exposé of the expansion of the Greeks from Istanbul in 1955. Thus, although the passion of the anti-junta period and the fervor associated with rally- ing to defend Cyprus after the inva- sion by Turkey inevitably have lost momentum, the junta period in Greece inadvertently generated im- portant and positive on-going links between Greece and Greek Ameri- can.

SOME ANTI-JUNTA activities re- turned to Greece after the fall of the junta to take part in political life there. Theodore Stathis, one of the ACFGD stalwarts, became a mem- ber of parliament, and a number of academics such as Nick Petropou- los, the founder of the JHD took up educational positions in Greece. The majority, however, remained in the US and took on increasing prominent roles in the community’s educational, social, and political life. All three of the academic jour- nals noted still exist and Modern Greek Studies programs have shown remarkable success.

The Greek Americans more closely identify with whatever happens to be current American for- eign policy rather than with their Hellenic heritage. All these and re- lated points are debatable. What is not debatable is that the junta peri- od initiated an estrangement of sorts between Greek Americans and homeland Greeks.

The present era is quite a different time than the one in which pro- duced a Greece that bred military dictators and Greek Americans who did not oppose tyrants. Formerly impoverished Greece is now so prosperous that it has become an importer of immigrants rather than an exporter. Fifty years has also changed Greek America, now more affluent than ever and far more conf- dent of its ethnic identity. What should be evident when we recon- sider the junta era is that Greek America must never again be so dis- tant from Greek realities as it was in 1967 and homeland Greeks must continue their recent enthusiasm for learning more about the realities of the diaspora in America. All of us will profit greatly from such an in- ethnic dynamic. We can more easily embrace these new realities of a new century if we resist from patronizing each other for what each seems as the other’s under-de-
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A Message from Theodore Spyropoulos
U.S. Regional Coordinator for the World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE)

“Greek Democratic Ideals and Values are the Solution to the Impasses of Society”

Democracy is society’s crowning achievement, and is of paramount importance to mankind.

Greece gave birth to the ideals of democracy, which were treasured and honored by its citizens at great costs and sacrifices.

Modern-day civilization traces its beginnings to Democracy, which goes hand in hand with liberty and respect for all men and women.

Democracy blossomed in the fertile soil of Greek Culture, which is dedicated to serving the moral and spiritual uplifting of man, and the ideals of justice, progress, solidarity and peaceful coexistence among people and nations.

History teaches us that we have an obligation to safeguard and protect our Democratic institutions. The fortieth anniversary of the fall of the military dictatorship that ruled Greece for seven years marks a period of significant developments for Hellenism all around the world. We have entered an era in which our motherland can boast of progress in all sectors. These recent success back home coincide with the reappearance of Philhellenes all around the world, and exciting developments taking place in Greek Communities across every continent.

As Greek Americans, we have a responsibility to safeguard the Democratic ideals established by our forefathers. Let us all rise to the occasion and meet this historic challenge by passing on this age-old legacy to the coming generations, as we spread the Hellenic values and principals that are inextricably linked to the ideals of Democracy.

Let us all join forces to preserve our national identity and unity. Let us all work together to secure the inalienable rights of our country and our people.

Let us all treasure the Democratic principles through which humanity will discover the solution to the impasses of modern society!