This article will outline the revolutionary stage of General Theodoros Pangalos’ military career and his entrance into Greek politics during the tumultuous years of 1922-23.

When the Royalist government resigned and King Constantine’s abdication took place in September 1922, a revolutionary committee (RC) headed by military officers (Colonels Plastiras and Gonatas and Naval Captain Fokas) seized power in Athens. Meanwhile generals Pangalos, Mazarakis, and Gargalidis established themselves at the office of the main Venizelist newspaper, Eleftheron Vima. The next step was to arrest and try the royalist politicians and military officers responsible for the Asia Minor debacle.

The prisoners were to be tried by a military tribunal and were subjected to close examination by Pangalos, whom the British Minister in Athens, Lindley described as “a fanatical Venizelist, who was charged with the duty of Public Prosecutor.” The accused were to be tried under decrees promulgated on October 25 and 29, which also strengthened the position of the RC. The ministers of Britain, France, and Italy sought assurances from the RC that the ex-royalists would not be executed and that their lives would be spared.

Shortly after the RC had seized power, they selected Sotirios Krokidas as prime minister, whose administration resigned in November 1922 during what became known as ‘the Trial of Six’. During the trial, as public prosecutor, Pangalos was more responsible than any other individual for the demand of exemplary punishment. He wanted the royalists executed, which would have satisfied the extremist Venizelist officers.

The RC was installed in power with Gonatas as prime minister and Pangalos as war minister in November 1922. Pangalos wrote to Eleftherios Venizelos, who was representing Greece at the Lausanne Conference, that the former wished to establish a dictatorial regime. Venizelos admonished Pangalos by strongly opposing the latter’s idea and pointing out that such a regime would have dire political and economic consequences for Greece. Britain and France would not approve, and also would not advance financial assistance to this regime.

Venizelos suggested that Greece strengthen its army in Western Thrace in case of a breakdown at the Lausanne Conference which might also result in the resumption of hostilities between Greece and Turkey. So, it was important for Pangalos as Commander of the Thracian (Evros) army to heed Venizelos’ advice in maintaining a disciplined force and preventing them from launching an unprovoked attack on Constantinople. Despite this, Pangalos was really itching for war with the Kemalists. He had turned a ragtag Asia Minor army into a battle-worthy total of ten infantry divisions and one Cavalry division with total strength of 110,000 men. The British and French expressed concerns that Pangalos might take a bold step in crossing the Maritza River to occupy Constantinople. Venizelos warned that Britain and France would not countenance a Greek attack upon Turkey. The major problem facing the allies was that they only had small force “consisting of two or three battalions, a squadron of cavalry, and one company of Italian troops,” which meant that “they could not prevent the Greek crossing, if they decided to do so.”

The Greek Foreign Minister, Alexandris, promised the British liberal politician and journalist, Sir Harold Spender, that Greece would not attack Turkey without the approval of the Allies. Pangalos was the uncertain factor if the conference ended without a decision. Greece was at the crossroad of peace or war at a time when the nation was saddled with a refugee crisis which needed international assistance. A new conflict would have pushed Greece into the abyss.

With the failure of the first stage of Lausanne Conference in early February 1923, war fever heated up in the Greek army. The Commander-in-Chief of Allied forces in Constantinople, Lt-General Harington told Pangalos that any action by Greek troops in the vicinity of the Maritza would be “considered provocative and [was] to be avoided” at all costs. Then again, the French military attache, Captain de Colombel told his British counterpart, Colonel Hoare Nairne, that Pangalos’ confidence in defeating the Turks was “exaggerated.” He discounted the ability of the Greek army to achieve victory – but Hoare Nairne reminded de Colombel of the series of military victories that the Greeks had achieved in July 1921.

In domestic politics, Pangalos made a surprising statement to Nairne that “Greece had no need for a King” and that he “would be kept so long as he kept within the limits of the constitution.” This ran counter to the RC policy that placed King George on the throne. Nairne, like de Colombel, believed that Pangalos would only keep the King on the throne so long as it suited his own agenda. Moreover, Pangalos did not care for the opinions of the RC nor Plastiras. Nairne viewed Pangalos “as ambitious, unscrupulous, and a dangerous factor in Greek politics. He [felt that he] could even establish a dictatorship.”

When the Lausanne proceedings resumed in April 1923, the main stumbling block was Turkish demands of reparations from Greece. In May, Venizelos and Alexandris were prepared to leave Lausanne if the Turks persisted in their demands for reparations. Pangalos was given orders to occupy Eastern Thrace, but the decision of Ismet Inonu, the prime Turkish delegate at Lausanne, to accept the Greek proposal of a strip of territory around Karagatch in lieu of reparations, removed a potential conflict situation.

For a short time, however, the allies were concerned about a new Greek-Turkish war which threatened to derail the conference.

On May 30, 1923, Pangalos and Captain Hadjikyriakos were dissatisfied over the way that reparations were being settled. Both telegraphed Alexandris that the latter had exceeded his authority. Alexandris offered his resignation without notifying Venizelos. Venizelos stated that Alexandris’ resignation should not be accepted and rebuked Pangalos’ intervention as most improper.

The situation was very fluid in the Greek army, with some elements itching for war and while others wanted to be demobilized.

The London Times reported on July 3rd, that Colonel Plastiras visited Pangalos in Thrace, where he was relieved of his command. Pangalos had the support of the extremist officers who contemplated a coup d’etat with the intention of establishing a dictatorship and postponing the elections indefinitely. They were afraid that they could receive an unfavorable election result. The more moderate officers were determined to avoid bloodshed and to stop the coup plot in its infancy.

In conclusion, Pangalos extracted his revenge with the execution of the royalists and was always itching for war with Turkey with the backing of the extremist Venizelist officers. Fortunately, Venizelos’s rebuke of Pangalos prevented the latter from taking military action, avoiding the ire of Britain and France.