The 50th dark anniversary of the illegal Turkish invasion of Cyprus marks a national tragedy of historical proportions. It represents the second loss of Hellenic territory after the Asia Minor Catastrophe in 1922, with only 52 years separating the two events. During these days, important speeches were and will be delivered. Hot tears will be shed in memory of the missing and the dead. Memories of the invasion will be revived: the massacres, the rapes, the occupation of ancestral homes by the Turkish invader, and the desecration of our sacred sites.

In a dynamic and symbolic act, the Prime Minister of Greece attended the events in Cyprus honoring, remembering, and showing solidarity just a few kilometers away from the Turkish President, who was there to celebrate their victory.

We must do these things. Woe to us if we do not. However, alongside mourning and lamentation, it would be wise to engage in self-criticism, to evaluate our own responsibility and role in the current situation: the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the occupation of a large portion of its territory, and the threat to the remaining part.

It may reassure us, but it is not enough to only criticize others – the Americans, the UN, etc. – for not preventing the coup against President Makarios, for not stopping the invasion, and for the fact that today, 50 years later, we have not regained an inch of our land, and that Ankara is proceeding with the merging of the occupied territories.

We must accept that the main responsibility lies with us. The Greek Cypriots and the Greeks. If we do not understand this, if we do not appreciate it, if we do not change our mentality, we are doomed to repeat the same mistakes.

Let’s consider some of our mistakes: Undoubtedly, we must begin with the Greek junta’s coup against Makarios. It provided the pretext for the Turkish invasion, and it was so foolish that it was treasonous. However, should we not also examine whether Makarios himself had any responsibility for the state of affairs at the time? Should we not question why Cyprus sided with and joined the Non-Aligned Movement instead of becoming a NATO member in order to be able to invoke Article 5 during a period of heightened Cold War tension between the West and the Soviet Union? Should we not reassess the endless negotiations under the auspices of the ‘toothless’ UN and the various proposals for a solution from UN Secretaries General and others, including the Annan Plan?

Was the Annan Plan, for example, as bad as its critics claimed, leading the Greek Cypriots to reject it? Journalist Yiannis Pretenderis writes in a significant article in Vima, titled ‘Anniversary’ (reprinted in the Greek language National Herald on July 18 p. 3): “… according to the Annan Plan, Turkish troops in Cyprus would have been reduced to 6,000 by 2011. By 2018, they would have dropped to 3,000. From then on, they would be limited to 950 Greeks and 650 Turks, numbers that would be revised downward every three years. But, of course, the Plan was rejected by those who feared becoming ‘a community without a voice’. How many Turkish troops are on Cyprus’ territory today, in the ‘internationally recognized state’? Approximately 30,000, according to the UN.”

So, what happened? Why did we not reach any agreement that preserved the dignity of the nation during these 50 years? Why did more than two generations of Greeks first fail to protect our lands and later to secure a solution ensuring the withdrawal of Turkish troops, the coexistence of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in a safe state, with a fair power distribution, equality, and equal rights, as in any European country? Why did we fail to work together, integrating the Diaspora into the effort to develop a national plan, especially leveraging the Greek community in the U.S., which imposed one of the strongest possible measures against Turkey: the American arms embargo, an unprecedented act for an American ally? The Diaspora challenged the leaders of the countries they live in and demonstrated by the hundreds of thousands in Washington and other cities with Greek populations.

Is our failure solely due to the inevitable, though unusually high, degree of patriotism from politicians and the media that led people to believe the solution lay in a UN resolution, a friendly foreign leader? No, of course not.

Here are some of the basic things we should have done:
We should have developed an internationally competitive education system. We should have worked hard to build a strong economy and thus acquire powerful armed forces. Despite the destruction we suffered, the nation did not enter a state of permanent vigilance, it did not upgrade as attempted in recent years, we did not engage in continuous competition with Turkey because our people were distracted, misled by demagoguery, and lacked a national vision.

This happened because we did not believe in our own strength, and in the possibility that Greeks and Cypriots united could achieve a fair solution, forcing both our allies and the other side to comply.

Is it too late to find a fair solution? No, it’s not. But it is more difficult now, after 50 years, than it was before. Nonetheless, this period of new general turmoil in the world might present another opportunity for a solution. Given the invasion of Ukraine. Given the turmoil in the Middle East. Given that Erdogan is an enemy of Israel. Given strong, experienced governments in Greece and Turkey.